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J-JE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

- - - - TE OF UTAH,
ie Interest of:
yGIRL McMURTREY,

No. 11607

v.
!ES N. THOMAS,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by James N. Thomas, the father
WGirl

McMurtrey, from the decision of the Second

ltrict Juvenile Court, State of Utah, the Honorable

•nal W. Garff presiding, which terminated all parental
of the appellant in his daughter on the sole ground
I

It although he was the natural father of Baby Girl

IMunrey and acknowledged his paternity and expressed

j
r·

.i
i

desire for custody of her, he was not the legal father
under the "laws of Utah," had no parental rights in

child.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On December 23, 1968 a petition for the permanent
rivation of all parental rights of Baby Girl McMurtrey
1filed

in the Second District Juvenile Court.

After a

ring on February 26, 1969, the matter was taken under
isement by the Court. On March 7, 1969 Appellant
d a petition reaffirming his paternity requesting custody
1aid child.

By Decree and Order entered April 3, 1969,

parental rights of both the Appellant and the mother of
were permanently terminated and legal custody
!guardianship of said child was placed in the Division
'

family Services for placement in a suitable adoptive

le. The sole basis for the termination of Appellant's
rights was the fact that he was not the legal
of Baby Girl McMurtrey.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant desires this Court to reverse the
. 2.

... 011

of the Juvenile Court after determining that

the juvenile Court Act the only basis for termination

'parental rights are those set forth in Section 55-10(l)(a)(b) or (c), Utah Code Annotated 1953 and, not
iing rhe legal father not being one of those conditions,
the Juvenile Court to hold a further hearing to
I

into the existence of those conditions or terminate

'ijurisdiction over Baby Girl McMurtrey and inquiry into
I

Is matter.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Baby Girl McMurtrey was born December 20, 1968

:Kathleen McMurtrey and the Appellant, James N. Thomas.
of the child were unmarried both at the time
It the child was conceived and at the time that the child

The parents had been married to each other

Im June 17, 1958 till in 1963, (R. 27 -28) and planned
remarried after the birth of the Baby Girl McMurtrey
a home for their child.

(R. 28-29). However,

lir plans were frustrated by the trauma of having the
!

seized and taken from their custody three days after
. 3.

ier birth and then facing the permanent deprivation

ietition in the Juvenile Court.

(R. 28-29-57).

A hearing

held on the allegations of the petition on February 26,

[969. (R. 1). The whole hearing concerned the allegations
I

petition dealing with the emotional inability of the

niother to care for her child.

(R. 1-37). The only inquiry

lbout the appellant was as to his marital status. However,

the Court recognized him as the father of the child

j,

jR. 1), he acknowledged his paternity and stated that he
I

the care, custody and control of his child.

I

was not questioned about his ability to do so.

(R. 27 -38)
The sole

'nqUtry by the Court and the County Attorney was whether
I

pr not he was the legal father of the child.
I

--

'

I

Thereafter, on March 7, 1969 appellant filed his

I

!

retition for custody with the Juvenile Court.

He supported

with his affidavit acknowledging paternity of Baby Girl

rcMurtrey and requesting custody of her to be granted to

rim.

(R. 48-50). On March 13, 1969 appellant filed a

!supplemental affidavit stating that he had a home for his

.

. 4.

.

Id, that he had purchased furniture and clothing to care
'

ber, and requesting that a home study be made to

1

his fitness to care for his child.
The Court entered its Findings of Fact and Decree
[ninating the parental interests of the Appellant and
IDleen McMurtrey on April 3, 1969.

(R. 44-45). The

·1

for terminating the parental rights of the
,ellant was that he was not the legal father of Baby Girl
Findings of Fact #3 (1) and (2).1 The petition

j,

I'

'Custody was denied without hearing by an order also
ered April 3, 1969. (R. 46 ).
The basis of the Juvenile Court's decision to
piinate the parental rights of Kathleen McMurtrey was
temotional inability to care for the child.

(R. 44-45).

Is is not questioned or challenged in this appeal.

I

!

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT,

ALTHOUGH APPELLANT IS THE NATURAL FATHER,

I

also the comment of the Court on this point quoted
(R. 37).
5 -

..

j

.

HE IS NOT THE LEGAL FATHER ANO, THEREFORE,
dAS NO LEGAL RIGHTS TO HIS CHILD, AND THE
CHILD MAY BE PLACED FOR ADOPTION.

' The Findings and Decree dated April 3, 1969,
ie as the only reason for permanently depriving appellant

ul parental rights to the child, the fact that he was not
rried to the child's mother at the time of the child's

Findings of Fact #3 (1) and (2) (R. 44-45).
)Judge Garff stated during the hearing:
i

i "[suppose;

technically, the child is an illegitimate

I child and the . . . statute of course states that the

: fathers of illegitimate children have no legal rights
i to the children." (R. 37)

i

i THERE

IS NO PROVISION IN THE JUVENILE COURT
AN
i ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS NO PARENTAL RIGHTS
IN THAT CHILD AND THE JUVENILE COURTS
TERMIN}\TION OF HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS UPON

i ACT THAT PROVIDES THAT THE FATHER OF

l

!, SUCH A SUPPOSED PROVISION IS ERROR WHICH

IMUST BE REVERSED.

.

.

l Examination of the Juvenile Court Act of 1965,
I

55-10-63 through 123, Utah Code Annotated,

I

reveals that there is no provision that provides that

father of an illegitimate child has no parental rights
I

child. Accordingly, if the court based its action

I

I

:

.
'

. 6.

'upon the assumption and belief that such a provision
'rexisted, the error is obvious and must be reversed by this

'1

:,court.
Such a provision was a part of the adoption statutes2
the State of Utah until 1966, but it was repealed at that

fime. It is clear that the District Court applying the
provisions would be applying the standards of the
Code, Section 78-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated,
1953
!

in terminating parental rights and permitting an
On the other hand the Juvenile Court would apply

I

standards of the Juvenile Court Act, Section 55-10-63 ·
I

in terminating parental rights and declaring a

I

eligible for adoption. 3 Each of these codes, the
I

Code, Section 78-30-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated

ts3, and the Juvenile Court Act, Section 55-10-63 et seq.
I

Fh Code Annotated, 1953, would be the Legislative
ction 78-30-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated ,1953.
55-10-78, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides in
t: "Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the
trier Courts of jurisdiction in adoptive proceedings."

!

. 7.

Ii

r

I

v,.,

of different policies, and, therefore could have
standards for the termination of parental rights.
the fact that the Adoption Code contained until
J66 the provision apparently relied upon by the Juvenile

vurt in this case would not permit the Juvenile Court
roceeding under its own act to apply a statute outside

.

is clear error and must be prohibited by

Court. Appellant will admit that the issue as to whether ,
f not the delineation of parental rights spelled out in

78-30-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is to
I

back to the actions of the Juvenile courts or

I

the Juvenile courts are to proceed solely upon their
Court Statutes, Section 55-10-63, et seq. Utah

I

Annotated, 1953, has never been resolved by this

I

lurt,
"

but the very fact that they are two separate codes

teak for themselves. ·rn addition there is that provision
Section 55-10-78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, set out
!footnote #3 which clearly .indicates each is s.eparate

r
!

t

should be read to govern the cases presented to the
•

8.

i

ren courts

respectively. Thus Section 78-30-1 et seq.

rh Code Annotated

1953, being part of the Judicial Code

govern actions in the District Court, while Section
I

et seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, constituting
juvenile Court Act should govern the Juvenile Courts.
provisions of the one should not be read into the other

rd if the Juvenile Court did so in the instant case, that
hor must be reversed.

I

i

Since, as noted above, there is no provision in the

!

rvenile Court Act that provides that the father of an
child has no parental rights in said child,
i

rne should be

inserted by means of the Judicial Code, if

rch a provision is found
I

to exist in that code. The policy

the Juvenile Court Act, as expressed in Section
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is not the same as
of the Judicial Code.

As discussed in Point I (C) of

is brief, the policy of the Juvenile Court Act is to

erve the best interests of the child. These clearly include
e establishment of a normal home with his natural parents.:·

• 9.

.,

would be precluded if the rule of the Judicial Code

that the natural fathers of illegitimate children
110

parental rights in said children, if said provision

5found to be the rule of that code, is held to be part of

juvenile Courts Act.

As discussed below, appellant

maintain this is not the current rule of the Judicial

fode though it has been the rule in the past.
f should

In any event

not, by this court, be read into and nade part

I

Juvenile Court Act even if it is found to still constitute

re rule of the Judicial Code.
Until 1966 it was clear that under the provisions of
I

78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the Judicial
provisions governing adoptions, an illegitimate child

I
'ould be adopted upon the consent of only the mother;

putative father had no standing in regard to such child.

I

t

v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d

35, 239; 364 P. 2d 1029 (1961).

Section 78-30-4, Utah

ode Annotated, 1953 provided:

"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent

of its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child without

the consent of its mother, if living . . . "
. 10.

.1

rver, this provision was amended in 1966 to provide:
"A child cannot be adopted without the consent
of each living parent having rights in relation to said

I

II

child . • • "

This court had held prior to said amendment that
-

natural. parents have primary and superior rights

their children this right may be surrendered or lost.
A:....:d_op!-t_io_n_of_D-===-' 122 Utah 525, 536, 252 P. 2d

i:.::re.:...::

(1953).

It could be lost voluntarily, Miller v. Miller,

rah 2d 290,

333 P. 2d 945 (1959),

In re Adoption of

, supra, or involuntarily through abandonment,
son v. Pierce, 14 Utah 2d 317, 383 P. 2d 925 (1963)
Application of Conde, 10 Utah 2d 25, 347 P. 2d 859 (1959)
through court determination of unfitness.

B

7 Utah 2d 398, 362 P. 2d 395,
Brown, 2 Utah 2d 30,

--------

' reh. den.

State in the

2 Utah 2d 334,

279 P. 2d

273 P. 2d 185 (1954).

e the parents have agreed to voluntarily permit

mination of their parental rights and the adoption of
ir child, this permission is usually final.

• ll.

Thomas v.

Aid Society of Ogden, supra. Miller v. Miller,

rra,

111 re Adoption of D.

supra.

Only extreme

permit the setting aside of that consent.
1

o.

v. Social Service & Child Welfare Department,
431 P. 2d 547 (1967).

2d 311,

It is also established that the Juvenile courts have
to terminate parental rights and declare

I

I

eligible for adoption. State in the Interest of

I

I

B. supra,

Devereaux v. Brown, supra.

With the

ception of the last two cited cases, all of these cases
tose under the Judicial Code and this court repeatedly
I

rted that there is a

that a child is

tter off with its natural parents and it is the policy of
courts to be reluctant to deprive parents of their children,
D

v. Social Service & Child Welfare Department,

pra, State in the Interest of K
option of D

B, supra,

supra, but the overriding concern

all cases will be the welfare of the child.

erce, supra,

In re

Wilson v.

Application of Conde, supra, In re
.12.

,

i.

of D

supra.

This policy is Legislatively

\;part of the Juvenile Courts Act, however, the policy
ernent goes even further, it states that actions by the
I

Court should be to preserve and. strengthen family
possible." Section 55-10-63, Utah Code
1953 (emphasis added).

I

1

In the instant case,

inquiry went no further than the marital status of the
ies. The testimony and affidavit of the appellant were
red by the court. The Legislative mandate of the
nile Courts Act was rejected by the Juvenile Court.

Appellant would have to admit that under Section
J0-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as it existed until

the Judicial Code contained the rule applied by the
nile Court in the instant case. Thomas v. Children's

Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 235, 239,
9(1961).

364 P. 2d

However, appellant would submit that the

6amendment to Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated

J, changed that statute to include the father of an
gitimate as one of the "parents" requiring notice of
. 13.

I

!11 ,j whose consent is necessary to an adoption4

the special conditions as are hereinafter described.

I

Examination of the amended wording of Section

h-30-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as set forth above

that the distinction between legitimate
I

illegitimate children has been eliminated.

1tates:

It now

·

I "A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each

living parent having rights in relation to said child, ••• ''
The term "parent" is defined in The Random House

ictionary of the English Language, Random House, Inc.

rew York,
"n. l.

1967 as:
A father or a mother, . . . 3, a source, origin,

It should also be noted that the instant fact situation is
clearly distinguishable from that presented in Thomas v.
Children's Aid Society of Ogden, supra. There the parents
were seeking to overturn by habeas corpus the voluntary
surrender of parental rights by the mother several months
after placement of the child with the agency. The father
took no part in any proceedings until the filing of the
application for the writ of habeas corpus. In the instant
case the father has been present at all hearings, has
repeatedly attempted to gain custody of his daughter, there
has been no voluntary giving up of parental rights by the
mother, and these proceedings have been conducted under
Li1e Juvenile Courts Act while the Thomas case was
conducted under the judicial Code .

. 14.

•11

1

I

or cause . .

"

As applied to the instant case there is no question

I

I

fut that the father of an illegitimate child must also be
notice of the proposed termination of his rights

rr his consent to said termination and adoption is
!

required if he is included in the somewhat criptic phrase:
I

I

" . . . having rights in relation to said child, . . . "
These words were chosen by the Legislature in lieu

f the former provision.

As construed by this Court in

eThomas decision, the former wording provided that
e father of an illegitimate child had no parental rights
nhis child.

The changed words must indicate some

esire to change the meaning of the prior provision.

It

s submitted that this new phrase is intended to have the
ffect of differentiating between the father of an illegitimate
hild who has deserted his child and the mother, and a
ather who has not deserted his child but who has fulfilled

is duties as a father except that of legitimizing his child. 5
As pointed out in Point I (C) of this Brief, there are

.15.

(continued over)

r

'

T11e language would also cover and include the father of

a legitimate child.

If this were not the intent of the

Legislature, there would have been no need to amend the'
statute, particularly in view of the construction of the
statute in Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, supri'
lf this court were to construe these words as having the

same meaning as before the amendment was made, it woulc
be negating the intent of the Legislature to effectuate a

change in meaning when it effectuated the change in wording
As has been pointed out above, Appellant has
acknowledged the baby as being his.

He has taken every

step possible to legitimize and gain custody of his child.
He would assert, if that were to be required, that his
actions have legitimized the child as being his own.

He

testified he would have remarried the mother anyway if
ti1is would not have the effect of

thrusting him

ack before the Juvenile Court because of her emotional
'SConrmued
three statutory methods of legitimizing a child. It is
onceivable that a father could not do any of these yet
ant to assume his parental duties. He was one of those
rotected by this amendment .
. 16.

I

I
r.srability.

(R. 28-33, 36).

If this Court were to hold that this matter is

omehow governed by the provisions of the Judicial Code

rather than the Juvenile Code, it is clear that either by
the child as his own by public acknowledgment

br by his attempts to legitimize his child, Appellant has
rought himself under the revised provisions of Section

%-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. To hold otherwise
would not only be a negation of Legislative intent by this

court, it could also constitute a denial to the Appellant
of his

rights to Equal Protection of law as guaranteed by

the constitution of the State of Utah, and the constitution
of the

United States of America.

In addition, should this

court find this situation is governed by the Judicial Code,
it should note that Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated,

1953, goes on to provide that:
" . . . except that consent is not necessary from a
father or mother who has been judiciaJly deprived
of the custody of the child on account of cruelty,
neglect or desertion; . . . " (emphasis added)
By this language the Legislature specifically stated

. 17.

,.

!

,Hily three cases where consent is not necessary, that
a parent has been judicially deprived of

1

I

rights for cruelty, neglect or desertion.

There

no such finding relating to the Appellant in the instant
!

Accordingly, to uphold the termination of Appellant's
rights in the absence of both his consent and one
rbese findings is not only an application of the wrong

Ol'isions by the Juvenile Court, which should be applying
eprovisions of the Juvenile Court Act, Section 55-10-63,

l

seq. Urnh Code Annotated, 1953, it is also an erroneous

plication of that provision. Accordingly, the Court must

verse this erroneous action and remand the case for

oper proceedings in accord with the correct law,
THE HOLDING OF THE JUVENILE COURT THAT THE

FATHER OE AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS NO
LEGAL PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THAT CHILD IS
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUVENILE
COURTS ACT AND MUST BE REVERSED BY THIS
COURT.
In the Juvenile Court Act of 1965, Section 55-10-63

123, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the term parent is
owhere defined.

However, Section

.18.

Utah

Annotated, 1953, states:
"The provisions of this Act, to the extent that they
are substantially the same as existing statutory
provisions relating to the same· subject matter, shall
be construed as restatements and continuations thereof
and not as new enactments. "
l
Application of this provision would require that examinatio•
of the Act existing before 1965 be undertaken to determine ·

whether or not the term "parent" was defined, and if so,

I could be .applied to define the use of the term "parent"
1t

ln the prov1s1ons of the 1965 Act.

It was defined in the

prior act and that definition was:

"Parent" when used in relation to a child, shall
include guardian and every person who is
liable to maintain a child. "
Section-55-10-64 (3) Utah Code Annotated (1953).
As discussed in Point I (C) infra, pursuant to the terms

of Section 77 -60-1, et seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
the father of an illegitimate child is by law liable to

maintain his child.

This is consistent with the policies

of the Juvenile Court Act as set forth in Section 55-10-63,

Utah Code Annotated 1953, and discussed in Point I (C)
. 19.

)

l:iif;:i. It is therefore clear that Appellant is a parent
I

within the meaning and intent of the Juvenile Court Act.

li is clear from the record that this _definition was
vnlied and appellant was recognized as the father of his

,l

[:i]d by the Court.

(R. 1).

Accordingly, appellant would be entitled to all the
onsiderations of the policy requirements expressed in
0

crion 55-10-63, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, before

Juvenile Court deprived him of his parental rights
,der Section 55-10-109, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

sis required by Section 55-10-100 (18) Utah Code

nnotated, 1953.
Since the appellant would be included under the term

rarem" as used i11 the Juvenile Court Act as pointed
ut above,

the Juvenile Court erred in holding that he

dno standing as a parent before the court as the father

an illegitimate child. The sole basis for terminating
sparental rights as a parent under the Juvenile Court
Ct

are those set forth_in Section 55-10-109 (1) (a), (b),
. 20

I

1 oi· (c).

1

I

Being the father of an illegitimate child is not

one of the grounds included in these provisions.

Accordingly, that ruling of the Juvenile Court must be
reversed and remanded for further consideration in
accord with the applicable provisions of the Juvenile
Court Act, Section 55-10-63 et seq.

Utah Code

Annotated, 1953.

C. IT IS TI-IE POLICY OF THE LAWS OF UTAH TO
ENCOURAGE AND PROMOTE THE ESTABLISHING
OF A NORMAL HOUSEHOLD BY THE PARENTS OF
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD WITH THE CONCOMITANT LEGITIMIZATION OF THE CHILD AND THE
RULE ADOPTED BY THE JUVENILE COURT,
TO-WIT: THAT THE FATHER OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD HAS NO PARENTAL RIGHTS IN HIS CHILD
WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THIS POLICY.

Section 55-10-63, Utah Code

1953, states:

"It is the purpose of this act to secure for each
child coming before the Juvenile Court such care,
guidance and control, preferably in his own home,
as will serve his welfare and the best interests of
the state; to preserve and strengthen family ties
whenever possible; . . . "
The best interests of the state and the preservation
and strengthening of family ties are most clearly

. 21.

i

l1... t. 1ced by encouraging the assumption of paternal
..

Jll \1'- 1

junc:s

and responsibilities by the father of an illegitimate

cnild. This is not only a matter of obvious public policy,
i[ is:;

rirntter of law.

The laws of Utah both encourage

and force the normalization of a family by encouraging
11:·,e rather

cutics

of an illegitimate child to assume the proper

as a father and husband.

At common-law, children

tern out of lawful wedlock could not be rendered legitimate
by any subsequent act of their parents.

The illegitimate

child was regarded as the child of no one, not even entitled
to a name

unless he gained one by reputation.

He could

;,ot inherit either through his father or his mother.

The sole duty his parents owed him was that of maintenance

because of the ties of nature.

However, as stated by this

Court:

"Even under the cold and pitiless rules of the
common law, which were conceived and enforced
to shield and protect the royalty and nobility of
England against the consequences of their sexual
derelictions, the putative fathen: of an illegitimate
child had rights respecting it which ordinarily were
paramount to all the· world except the mother. "
Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 P. 716, 724

\1914).

. 22.

I

·;_ o modify the harsh rule of the common law, the

\

uah Legislature has provided three statutory procedures

by which a putative father may make an illegitimate child

legitimate.

Section 77-60-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

which provides that the illegitimate child becomes legitimat1

by the subsequent marriage of the parents, Section 74-4-10,
utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides that an

illegitimate child is the heir of the person who acknowledgeE
himself to be the father of such a child, and Section
7S-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides
that the child may become legitimate by public acknowledg-

ment.
Under the facts of the instant case the decision of
the Juvenile Court must be examined in light of the

provisions of Section 78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
"The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly
acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such
with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into
his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a
legitimate child, -t:hereby adopts it as such, and

. 23.

r

l..'.hi1d is thereupon deemed for all purposes
L;.:;ttimcitc from the time of its birth. The
foregoing provisions of this chapter do not apply
such an adoption. "

to

tccord here affirmatively shows that Appellant

cly acknowledged that Baby Girl McMurtrey was his

1

Ic":ild.

He stated in open court, under oath, at the
February 26, 1969, that he was the father of the

c::ild, (R. 29) that he desired custody of the child,

30)

.ie was once married to the mother of the child, (R. 27)

chat al though he and the mother were divorced at
the rime of the birth of the child, they had planned to

re-marry and establish a home for the child after it had
been born. (R. 28-29).

If further public acknowledgment

were needed, the record also contains Appellant's petition
or custody with his affidavits in support thereof, which
·ncludes a statement of his acknowledgment of paternity
nd his desire to gain custody of his child. (R. 47 -SO).

This court has held that:
"The essentials to a legitimation are public
acknowledgment by the father, receiving of the
. 24.

1..:hild into his family and treatment of it as a
lcgi tin-1atc child." In re Garr' s Estate, 31
Cwh 57, 86 P. 757, 761, (1906).
The appellant here meets all these requirements
c:::ccpt that of having received the child into the home.

This

not be effectuated solely because of the intervention
of social workers of the State Division of Family Services
who removed the child from the hospital three days after

hc:r birth, took her away to a paid foster care household

a11d the erroneous ruling of the Juvenile Court which

?:·ohibited the appellant from giving his child the love,
care and home he had anticipated providing.

This child could have been ma:le legitimate by the
wbsequent marriage of the parents.
Code Annotated, 1953.

I by them.

Section 7 4-4-10,

Indeed this was contemplated

However, because of the action for permanent

oeprivation of parental rights, in the first instance, and
because of the court's finding that the mother is
rnable

to

properly care for and nurture the child as a

result of her severe and disabling emotional and

• 25.

'

)

I

problems.

.

D!Jced in a dilemma.

1

(R. 44), the appellant is

If he married the mother, the child

wJl t..:.:come legitimate, but the parents will probably

i

be forced to defend a deprivation action on the basis

'

of ri1e juvenile Court's action in the case regarding the

I'

iI rnoth2r.

If he does not marry the mother and legitimize

\

f

:he child, the Juvenile Court's holding, if let stand by

, this Court, would hold he has no legal interest in his child.

appellant has done everything he could to legitimize
!':ls c:1iJd and gain custody of her.

The tragic irony is

' :hat rhe actions and rulings of the Juvenile Court have
bEa-r2d him from legitimizing his child, yet it is this

same lack of legitimization that is being used by the
1 Juvenile

Court as the basis for permanently terminating

his pl rental rights without examining his fitness as a

parcm. Clearly this is a violation, not only of the

, policies of the law, but of fundamental fairness, that is,
Due Process as well.

I

. 26.

r:1c dppcllant had not chosen to act as he has,
"·
tJJ-.1l

·s anempting to assume his parental responsibilities,

J.

'

lt is clear that the Laws of Utah would force him to assume

u'h::m. Tl12 mother, through the State, could have

him for the "crime" of bastardy, Section
r

77-60-1 w 16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

If "convicted"

appellant would have been forced to acknowledge and

fupport his child; thereby legitimizing it. The mother

F

I

1f rh.e

public authority chargeable by law with the support
child could have brought an action for paternity

'1

which, if the putative father were held to be the father,

vould result in his.iacknowledgment" and support of his
Section 78-45a-l to 17, Utah Code Annotated,
The duties established by these actions can be

rforced in other states. Section 78-45-1 to 13, Utah

rde Annotated,
!

1953.

The statutory scheme thus

in Utah seeks to "encourage" the father of an

fegitimate child to assume his duties and responsibilities
and husband, and, if he does not respond, it

. 27.

,,i'_;::o

'

cllc n-1.lchinery to force him to do so.

The

,;,.«;:: ci rhc ] uvenile Court in the instant case is

contrary to these policies and must be reversed.

,:
_::o

ifOfiJC

tilat it is the appellant, not the Juvenile

Coe,.-:, w;10 is seeking to effectuate these policies and laws.

POINT II.
';''.,i:: JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN PERMANENTLY

ALL PARENTAL RIGHTS OF
;\??ELLANT IN HIS CHILD WHERE IT FAILED TO
:'I:\D THAT IN REGARD TO APPELLANT THERE
\:YAS EXISTING ANY CONDITION WITHIN SECTION
55-10-109, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
The sole authority for the permanent termination

'p;;.r2m:J rights by the Juvenile Court is Section 55-10-109,
Co(]C

Annotated, 1953. Any order of permanent

rlilir:ation of parental rights must be based on one of
erhree conditions set forth in subsection (l)(a), (l)(b),

\(l;(c) of that statute.
!

Since permanent termination

p;::·enrnl rights is such a drastic remedy, not only
1st the condition upon which the deprivation is based
I

of Lhose set forth in subsection (1), but also
. 28.

--· :::ic:2;..:ir:.g to establish the basis has the burden
· r·

••;::,

that the condition exists.

State in Interest

Utah 2d
11181, filed January 19, 1970).

l.
:a '": :N
1,.\.,-1...•

.,

---p
As was

this court in this recent decision:

''Depriv<;.tion of the parents' custody of their children
is a drastic remedy which should be resorted to
c:;',.y in extreme cases and when it is manifest that
r:.2 ;;ome itself cannot or will not correct the evils
w:1icl1 exist. A cutting of family ties is a step of
L:t:T1ost gravity and is undesirable, both socially
::i.nd economically, and should be avoided unless
is the only alternative to be found consistent
wir'.1 the best interests of the children. · There is
a presumption that it is generally for the best
incerest and welfare of children to be reared under
the care of their natural parents. Under this
presumption, the burden of persuading the trier
cf fc;cr is al ways on the person who claims that
n will be for the best interests of the child to
be reared by someone other than the natural
parents of such child. To support a decision
to deprive a parent of its child the court must
fir:::;t be convinced of such fact by a preponderance
of the evidence. "
It is clear from examination of the transcript

It>· proceedings (R. 1-37) and the Findings of Fact and
'crce entered in this matter (R. 44-45), there was no
i

into any of the three grounds which form the basis

. 29.

deprivation under the provisions of

,
'

cnOii

SS-10-109(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to-wit:

a coi1Jirion seriously detrimental to the child, (b)
if,, .. ·
!u;\;

.cnt of the child by the parent or parents, (c)

o: refusal of the parent or parents to give the child

ipc;· parental care and protection after a period of trial.
:orC1r:gly, there is no authority for or basis upon which
jL1vcnile Court could permanently terminate the parental
nts of fae Appellant and the court's order permanently

the Appellant's parental rights in his child,
y Cirl

McMurrrey, must be reversed by this court.
CONCLUSION

Since the Juvenile Court permanently terminated

ellam' s parental rights in his daughter on the sole

sthat he was not the legal father of the child in
ruvemion of the applicable laws of the State of Utah,
hc,dit:g must be reversed.

Under the Juvenile Court

the father of an illegitimate child is considered as

oft he child.
. 30

The sole method of and basis

-· \\illc:1
U}'J,

his parental rights may be terminated

pe 1·rnJ:·1cntly is by finding that one of the conditions

ser

in Section 55-15-109 (1), (a), (b) or (c) exist.

No ,:;den condition was found to exist in the instant case.

the decision of the Juvenile Court must be

'I

I
reversed and this matter reversed for further consideration!
[Mt

I

court.
Respectfully submitted,
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